State v. Coon, (Ohio 2011)

Ohio Supreme Court

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Summary


postrelease control; R.C. 2929.191; sentence served; res judicata; hearing

Summary


postrelease control; R.C. 2929.191; sentence served; res judicata; hearing

Text




[Cite as State v. Coon, 2011-Ohio-324.]

  Court of Appeals of Ohio    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT  COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA        JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION  No. 94505          STATE OF OHIO    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE    vs.    ROGER COON    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT          JUDGMENT:  REVERSED AND VACATED          Criminal Appeal from the  Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas  Case No. CR-492825    BEFORE:  Gallagher, P.J., Kilbane, A.J., and Celebrezze, J.    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:  January 27, 2011  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 

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  Robert Tobik  Chief Public Defender    BY: Cullen Sweeney  Assistant Public Defender  310 Lakeside Avenue, Suite 200  Cleveland, Ohio 44113      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE    William D. Mason  Cuyahoga County Prosecutor    BY: Daniel T. Van  Assistant Prosecuting Attorney  The Justice Center, 8th Floor  1200 Ontario Street  Cleveland, Ohio 44113                        SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J.:  {¶ 1}  Appellant, Roger Coon, appeals the order of the Cuyahoga County  Court of Common Pleas that added a five-year term of postrelease control to his  sentence.  For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the order of the trial court  and vacate the imposition of postrelease control on Coon’s sentence. 

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{¶ 2}  In 2007, Coon was convicted of four counts of gross sexual  imposition and was sentenced to three years of community control sanctions.   On December 3, 2009, the trial court found Coon to be in violation of his  community control sanctions and imposed a six-month prison term with three  years of postrelease control.  {¶ 3}  Because the postrelease control term should have been five years,  the state requested the imposition of postrelease control pursuant to R.C.  2929.191 in light of State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920  N.E.2d 958.  The trial court held a hearing on December 23, 2009.  At the  hearing, the court imposed a five-year term of postrelease control.  Coon has  appealed this decision and has raised two assignments of error for our review.  {¶ 4}  Coon’s first assignment of error provides as follows:    “The trial court  failed to adequately advise appellant about the consequences of violating  postrelease control.”  {¶ 5}  Coon asserts that when the trial court imposed the five-year term of  postrelease control, the court failed to inform him that the consequence of  violating postrelease control would be a term of imprisonment for up to one-half of  his original prison sentence.    {¶ 6}  The state claims that Coon was on notice of this consequence  because he was informed of it at the December 3, 2009 hearing, where the trial  court had erroneously imposed a postrelease control term of three years.  The  state essentially attempts to apply the earlier advisement to the subsequent 

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sentence correction, thereby making two improper notifications of postrelease  control into a proper advisement.  We are not persuaded by the state’s  argument.  {¶ 7}  In Singleton, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed R.C. 2929.191, the  statutory remedy to correct the trial court’s failure to properly impose postrelease  control, and held, in relevant part:    “[f]or criminal sentences imposed on and after  July 11, 2006, in which a trial court failed to properly impose postrelease control,  trial courts shall apply the procedures set forth in R.C. 2929.191.”  Id. at  paragraph two of the syllabus.  R.C. 2929.191 applies to qualifying offenders  who have not yet been released from prison.    The statute provides that the court  may, after conducting a hearing, “correct an original judgment of conviction by  placing on the journal of the court a nunc pro tunc entry that includes a statement  that the offender will be supervised under R.C. 2967.28 after the offender leaves  prison and that the parole board may impose a prison term of up to one-half of  the stated prison term originally imposed if the offender violates postrelease  control.”    Id. at ¶ 23; R.C. 2929.191.        {¶ 8}  The hearing contemplated by R.C. 2929.191 is for the proper  imposition of postrelease control, which would include the requisite advisements.    Therefore, we find that a trial court must notify the offender, both at the hearing  and in its journal entry, that the parole board can impose a prison term of up to  one-half of the stated prison term if the offender violates postrelease control. R.C.  2929.191(B)(1).   

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{¶ 9}  At the hearing held on December 23, 2009, the trial court failed to  inform Coon of the consequences for violating postrelease control.  Because  Coon was not properly notified of postrelease control, we must vacate this portion  of his sentence.  Furthermore, because Coon has completed his prison  sentence, he can no longer be subjected to postrelease control.    State v. Bezak,  114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 18.  Coon’s first  assignment of error is sustained.  {¶ 10}  Coon’s second assignment of error provides as follows:  “The trial  court erred in adding postrelease control to appellant’s original sentence as the  addition was precluded by the doctrines of waiver and res judicata when the state  failed to appeal the omission of postrelease control from appellant’s original  sentence.”  {¶ 11}  We reject this argument pursuant to State v. Fischer, ___Ohio  St.3d____, 2010-Ohio-6238, ___N.E.2d___.  Consistent therewith, Coon’s  second assignment of error is overruled.  {¶ 12}  For the reasons stated under the first assignment of error, the order  of the trial court is reversed and the imposition of postrelease control is vacated.   It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.  The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.  It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the  common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.   

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A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule  27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.      SEAN C. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, A.J., and  FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR   

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